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The Semantic Differential in the
Study of Musical Perception:
A Theoretical Overview
By Robert Miller
University of Connecticut
uestions concerning what music
"means," how and why those
meanings arise, and how children can be educated to understand those meanings have long occupied
philosophers, musicologists, and educators. Most of our educational processes in
music are intimately tied to engaging children in the search for meaning of one
sort of another. For the musician, the
very term "meaning" carries several
denotations. It might subsume the simplest translation of music notation into
sounds ("this note 'means' this sound"),
or far more complex processes in which
other kinds of significance are derived
from the forms and combinations of musical sounds themselves. This article addresses these latter kinds of meaning
generally, with eventual emphasis on the
kind of meaning system (or "semantic")
described by Osgood and his colleagues.
Meaning in music arises in many ways
and can take many forms. When a person
encounters a piece of music (either hearing a new piece or rehearing an old piece
with which she is, as Perlmutter and Perkins (1982) would say, "building up an
experience' '), a series of meaning problems is presented. If the piece is not ignored, these general problems of meaning
(What is this? How do I make sense of it?
How do I respond to it?) are addressed
either unconsciously or through learned
heuristic tactics. Both the unconscious
meaning process and the heuristic meaning process have their roots in the perceiver's total history of experience with
music. Much of that experience is informal, accruing simply from living in a
given musical culture, especially while
young. Campbell (1988) has postulated

Q

that early musical experience results in
the learning of an implicit music rule
structure which permits musical communication. These rules allow individuals to
understand cadences and phrase boundaries. In practice, these rules are analogous to the implicit rules for language understanding. They may be learned in
much the same way as language rules and
in the same developmental period.

•• A foundation of the present
discussion is the constructionist
premise that meaning exists only
in the mind and results from the
mind's ability to impose order on
the data coming from the senses.~
For many members of the Western cultures, there are other strategies for making sense out of music. Some of these are
explicit, reflecting conscious, learned,
heuristic tactics such as music students
might use in identifying the style period
of a piece played in a "drop the needle"
exam. Likely there is a sort of continuum
from habitualized, unconscious sensemaking through the more formalized
heuristic tactics resulting from study.
A visual example (Hrushovski, 1981)
can be borrowed to demonstrate one of
these kinds of meaning. The lobed arch
on the left of Figure 1 represents, or carries the sense of, or means Islamic architecture in Spain. The arch on the
right, however, represents Gothic architecture. For each of us there was a time
when these forms did not carry these
meanings. The forms were, in this way,
meaningless. Some might have learned
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the meaning of these forms from living in
the culture; others might have applied
more explicit strategies to derive meaning. A similar condition exists for music.
A listener's derivation of meaning can
be the result of study in music theory
where listeners are taught to form a tonal
context within which to place a musical
composition. Study in music history
allows listeners to develop yet another
context of meaning. A listener's attitude
toward music of various kinds reflects
meaning, as does performance, which
forms a music communication "link"
between the performer and the listener.
The notion that music is meaningful is
so pervasive that the opposite assertion,
that music is meaningless, doesn't often
arise.
A foundation of the present discussion
is the constructionist premise that meaning exists only in the mind and results
from the mind's ability to impose order
on the data coming from the senses. The
argument is that the data received through
the senses are actually sparse and impoverished compared to the mind's responses,
which are complete and rich. The mind
combines sensual data, thought, memory,
and construction strategies of various
kinds to "build up" meanings of an object or event.
The result of this building up is sensemaking or order. Order may be portrayed
as many separate but interrelated organizational schemes or structures in the mind.
The mind's representation of a single object, or event, or abstraction can exist in
several of these organizational schemes at
once. Sensations are made into sense by
the placement of these representations of
objects, events, or abstractions into context within these organizational structures.
There is even evidence that, just as our
theory and musicology teachers hoped,
these consciously learned strategies may
become so integrated into a listener's
sense-making apparatus as to be indistinguishable from the "music communication" system described by Campbell. For
example, when musicians with a great
deal of formal training were asked to
judge similarities among music examples,
they seemed to attach far greater importance to historical context than did un-
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trained listeners. This was apparently true
even when no formal historical question
was asked (Miller, 1979). Thus we see
that the results of the formal, explicit
study are not simply laid over or applied
to the previously existing implicit rule
structure; parts of the explicit become integrated with the implicit.
For purposes of this article, meaning is
equated with sense-making. We can call
one's total mental configuration of schemes
the "cognitive" structure. Sense-making,
or the derivation of meaning, involves
the mind's placement of those representations within this cognitive structure.
Because the cognitive structure can be
modified, made more complex, expanded,
or contracted, the meaning of the mental
representation of an object, event, or abstraction is not necessarily stable. It
changes.
Once an object, event, or abstraction
has been processed from the initial sense
data and placed in the cognitive structure,
the assertion is that a "concept" has been
formed. Recall that meaning exists only
in the mind; thus, strictly speaking, it is
not the object, event, or abstraction that
has meaning, it is the mental representation of concept that has meaning. The
concept is related to or refers to other
concepts within as well as outside the
mind; it is the cognitive structure that
provides this bridge to the external world
of objects and events.

Musical Meaning and
Music Learning
Questions about the meaning of music
and the ways of deriving that meaning
have challenged many music educators.
For instance, Langer's answers to these
questions induced Leonhard and House
(1972) and Reimer (1970) to articulate
philosophies of music education based
upon her conclusions. These educational
philosophies were then translated into
educational practice both through widely
used classroom materials such as the Silver Burdett & Ginn's Music (Reimer, 1985)
and the legions of graduate of doctoral
programs now training teachers in colleges across the country. In a further example, Meyer's (1956) ideas about "embodied" versus "designative" meaning
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were manifested in the educational philosophy of Broudy (1972). Meyer's ideas
concerning meaning were expressed as
curriculum by Colwell (1966) and by the
CEMREL Aesthetic Education Program
(Madeja & Onuska, 1977). Clearly, questions of musical "meaning" are important
in education.
Psychologists, too, have often been concerned with questions of musical meaning. These studies can be loosely classified under two rubrics. The first can be
called the "music has only musical meanings" classification. Investigators who
hold this point of view maintain that the
meaning of music is purely musical; musical concepts are understood only by their
placement in purely musical cognitive
schemes, and extra-musical meanings are
trivial if they exist at all. An example is
the Heller and Campbell (1982) model,
which postulates that music exists only as
an element in a uniquely musical communication process. A second example can
be found in the cognitivist/constructionist
approach of Serafine (1983) which relies

on building up a purely musical context/
response structure in the mind of the
listener.
The opposite point of view accepts as
valid that music can share qualities of meaning with other types of concepts; that is,
that mental representations of music may
also reflect or make reference to extramusic qualities. The famous experiments
by Hevner (1936), which derived the
"adjective circle", are from this point of
view. It is also in this spirit that semantic
differential research in music has proceeded.

The Semantic Differential
The semantic differential or "SD" technique was derived by Osgood (1953; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) to examine the cross-cultural universality of
meaning. This family of techniques has
been described by Kerlinger (1973) as "a
method of observing and measuring the
psychological meaning of concepts" (p.
566). Measurement, and through it control and prediction, is a major concern of
science. Because questions about musical
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meaning are so important, an approach
which offers to measure and quantify
meaning becomes potentially attractive.
The following list of studies demonstrates that the semantic differential has
been used to address a wide variety of research problems in music. Crozier (1974),
Hare (1974), and Bragg and Crozier (1974)
used SD scales to examine the importance
of complexity as an element in musical
perception. Van de Geer, Levelt, and
Plomp (1962) used SD scales to examine
the meanings of musical consonance and
dissonance. Accurso (1967) devised a
more general semantic differential instrument to examine differences in the meaning of examples of popular and serious
music by naive and sophisticated listeners.
The SD technique has been applied crossculturally to musical stimuli by Keil and
Keil (1966). SD technique has been used
to examine the relationships between
musical stimuli and visual art (Ruth &
Kolehmainen, 1974). It was also used by
O'Briant and Wilbanks (1978) to examine
whether or not the meaning of a piece of
music can be affected by establishing various moods in the listener before the
music is heard. Pellizzoni (1986) used
semantic differential technique to search
for differences in the meanings of fragments of examples of serious music by
both musicians and nonmusicians.
The attitude that a person holds about
something is strongly related to the meaning of that thing to the person. That attitudes toward music can be studied through
the application of SD has been shown by
Buss (1971) and Darling (1982). Holbrook
and Huber (1979) used semantic differential to predict affective response to saxophone jazz recordings.
While SD studies are verbal, other research tools are not. Often researchers
using these purely nonverbal techniques
encounter some difficulty in labeling and
reporting their results. The results of
some studies are intuitively interpretable
by the researcher who is intimately familiar with the nonverbal stimulus materials,
but not by others. Some verbal interpretation is necessary for meaningful reporting
and discussion. Occasionally, SD is used
to provide verbal labeling data for essentially nonverbal studies. Sometimes these

Published by OpenCommons@UConn, 2021
66

nonverbal techniques include other factor
analytic procedures which yield numerical output (Nordenstreng, 1968). Other
studies have used SD to label the essentially visual product of multidimensional
scaling procedures which have been applied to music (Hare, 1975; Miller, 1979).
The technique for gathering the raw
data for the semantic examples of whatever class of object, event, or abstraction
is under study. The things under study
are referred to as "stimuli", following the
behaviorist convention for use of that
term. Responses might be made to actual
objects (say, recordings of five-second musical examples), or to abstractions ("the
music of Beethoven," "the music of
Brahms") In nonmusical studies, the
stimuli have included nations, abstractions
like "God" and "hunger", and more concrete stimuli like color chips. The individual
subjects in an SD experiment are asked to
respond to each stimulus through the use
of a number of bi-polar adjective scales,
for example:
LOUD::__ :_: _: __ :__ :_: SOFT
OOUGH:_:_:_:_:_:_:_:SMOillH
STRONG :_: _: _: _: _: _: _: WEAK
Respondents are usually asked to place a
mark in the space which corresponds to
the degree to which the stimulus is related
to the quality in question. For example, if
the respondent judged the example in
question to be "very loud", he might mark
the space closest to "Loud"; if the stimulus was judged to be "quite soft", he would
mark the scale toward the opposite end.
The results are usually converted to
numbers and then treated either as Likertlike scaling results or as input for factor
analytic procedures. For a more complete
explanation of the derivation and use of
semantic differential scales, see Osgood,
et al.,(1957) and Torgerson (1958).
Because of the very clear instructions
given for the construction and analysis of
SD scales by Osgood, et al., and because
of the many studies which can serve as
models, the selection of scales and administration of the SD instrument is not
too difficult. Interpretation of the results,
however, is a different matter. There is a
well-articulated theory-representational
mediation-to
assist in interpretation, but
it is not always invoked by the researchers.

5
The Quarterly

Visions of Research in Music Education, Vol. 16 [2021], Art. 11

Perhaps the use of the semantic differential has become so routine that its techniques are becoming dissociated with the
original thinking that generated semantic
differential techniques. Science would not
be served if the methods of data gathering and analysis become divorced from
theory. Considering these omissions and
the recent cognitive!constructionist approaches to music research which seem
to point to further mediational structures
to explain musical experience (Perlmutter
& Perkins, 1982), a restatement of the
theoretical bases for the semantic differential and the theory of meaning from
which it is derived is in order.

Discussing

Meaning

Osgood, et al., (1957) begin their discussion of meaning by casting three definitions. The first is the "pragmatical"
definition of meaning; it is the relationship of signs to situations and behaviors.
When a sociologist inquires about the
"meaning" of a sign, this is most often
the definition intended. The second definition, which is the basis for questions
asked by linguists, may be termed the
"syntactical" definition; it states that
meaning is the relationship of signs to
other signs. Psychologists and philosophers, on the other hand, have been
more interested in what might be called
the "semantical" definition of meaning.
This definition holds that meaning is the
relationship of signs to their significance.
The authors consider the philosopher
to be interested most often in "stating the
logically necessary and sufficient conditions for signification, which mayor may
not involve the behavior of the sign-using
organism as component; the psychologist
is typically interested in the role of the
organism's behavior in mediating the relationship between signs and significates"
(p. 5).
There are several theories of how psychological meaning arises, or the process
by which a stimulus which is not an object becomes a sign of that object (Osgood,
1953). First is the mentalistic view, perhaps the most "classical" view of meaning. It stems from the Western naturalist
philosophers and holds that signs and
their objects are physical events; there

must be some mental event that links the
two together. The core of this mental
event is the "idea". The definition of
meaning from this position, says Osgood,
thus may be stated: "... something
which is not the object becomes a sign of
that object when it gives rise to the idea
associated with that object" (p. 201).
The substitution view holds that an
over-zealous application of the principles
of Pavlovian conditioning leads to the
theory that organisms assign meaning
after being conditioned to the responses
originally made to objects. Thus the object is viewed as the unconditioned
stimulus, and the sign as the conditioned
stimulus. Osgood's (1953) definition of
the sign process from this point of view
is, "... whenever something which is not
the object elicits in the organism the
same reactions evoked by the object, it is
a sign of the object" (p. 201).
Meaning as a set or disposition is a step
back in the direction of the mentalistic
view. It holds that signs derive meaning
by "taking account of" the objects they
signify. Osgood (1953) states this view as
"... any pattern of stimulation which is
not the object becomes a sign of that object if it produces in that organism a 'disposition' to make any of the responses
previously elicited by the object" (p. 202).

The Process of
Representational

Mediation

Osgood rejects all of these in favor of
another approach to understanding how
signs arise. He calls this process "representational mediation". While related to
Morris's (1946) set or disposition theory,
it differs in that it provides an explanation for how the disposition or mindset
comes about in the first place.
As described by Osgood (1953), representational mediation involves four premises, here given and amplified by his explanation of how a rat is conditioned to
recognize a buzzer as a sign of an impending electrical shock, or how the
buzzer comes to mean electrical shock
to the rat:
1. Stimulus objects (S) elicit a complex
pattern of reactions from the organism,
these reactions varying in their dependence upon the presence of the stimulus
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A. Development of a sign.
B. Development of an assign.
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object for their occurrence. Electric
shock galvanizes the rat into vigorous
jumping, squeaking, and running, as
well as autonomic "anxiety" reactions.
Food elicits salivating, chewing, lipsmacking, and so forth. Components
like salivating and anxiety are relatively
independent of the food or shock stimulation and can occur when such objects
are not present.
2. When stimuli other than the stimulus
object, but previously associated with it,
are later presented without its support,
they tend to elicit some reduced portion
of the total behavior elicited by the
stimulus-object. This reduction process
follows certain laws: (a) mediating reactions which interfere with goalachievement tend to extinguish; (b) the
more energy expenditure involved in
making a particular reaction, the less
likely it is to survive the reduction process; (c) there is evidence that certain
reactions (e.g., autonomic) condition
more readily than others and hence are
more likely to become a part of the
mediation process. This last may merely
reflect factor b above.

3. The fraction of the total object-elicted
behavior which finally constitutes the
stable mediation process elicited by a
sign . . . will tend toward a minimum set
by the discriminatory capacity of the organism. This is because the sole function
of such mediating reactions in behavior
is to provide a distinctive pattern of
self-stimulation.
4. The self-stimulation produced by the
sign-elicited mediation processes becomes conditioned in varying strengths
to the initial responses in hierarchies of
instrumental skill sequences. This mediated self-stimulation is assumed to provide a "way of perceiving" signs and
their meaning, as well as mediating instrumental skill sequences-behaviors
to
signs which take account of the objects
represented (p. 203).

Osgood's theory of how meaning arises
may be stated formally as
a pattern of stimulation which is not the
object is a sign of that object if it evokes
in the organism a mediating reaction this
(a) being some fraction of the total behavior elicited by the object, and (b)
producing distinctive self-stimulation
that mediates responses which would
not occur without the previous association of the objects and nonobject patterns of stimulation (p. 203).

Osgood's theory has been clarified and
illustrated by Tzeng (1972). In his illustration (Figure 2), paradigm A presents the
development of a sign. The stimulus object (S) elicits a complex pattern of behavior (RT) in the organism. Portions of
this behavior become conditioned to the
sign ([SJ); when the sign sequence is repeated several times, the mediation process is reduced to one requiring minimal
effort. This mediation reaction (rm) still
includes a portion of those reactions
originally elicited by S. The mediating
reaction produces a distinctive pattern of
self-stimulation in the organism which,
in turn, may elicit a variety of overt
behaviors (Rx).
The stimulus-producing process (rm -7 snJ
is representational in that it includes a
portion of the behavior (RT) elicited by
the significate itself. It is mediational in
that the self-stimulation (sm) may become
associated with a variety of instrumental
acts (Rx).
Osgood's view of the stimulus-response
can thus be seen as a two-stage process.
The first stage, decoding (or s -7 rm) is the
association of signs with representational
mediators. The second stage, encoding (or
sm -7 Rs) is the association of mediated
self-stimulation with overt behaviors.
The majority of signs used in ordinary
communications are more properly thought
of as "assigns." That is, they are in a sense
"assigned" a meaning through their association with other signs rather than through
their relationships with objects signified.
The development of an assign is illustrated in paradigm B of Figure 2. Here
portions of the representational behavior

from a set of signs

([}l] ,~

, ...

[!;!J ),

transfer to a new assign to form a (I S/)
new representational mediator

which becomes the meaning of the assign. The very core of communicative
sign usage lies in the formation and use
of assigns. The act of reading, for
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instance, involves the use of assigns
(marks on apage) derived from other
signs (spoken language).
Because the behaviors of different persons toward the same object vary, it
should be clear that the meanings which
they ascribe to the same sign for that object will also vary. The composition of
the mediational process which is the
meaning of the sign is entirely dependent
on the total behavior (Rr) of the individual toward the object. This is probably no
less the case for the meaning of music.
That, too, should be viewed as the result
of a compounded mediation process. The
meaning of music is still dependent on
the learned responses of the listener
within a given musical culture. Meaning,
however, even for a single assign (/S/) is
not the result of a single response. Meaning is more complex than that.

The Componential
of Meaning

Nature

A critical assumption of Osgood's
theory is that the representational mediation processes are componential in nature. That is, a relatively small number of
rm's (r with a lower-case m, denoting a
semantic component) may serve to
differentiate a large number of rM's (r
with an upper-case M, denoting a total
mediation process). This explanation is
due to the ability of the rm's to serve in
various combinations. Each of the rM's is
related to its source behavior in some
unique manner, but unique as a whole
and not unique in the same sense that
the rm components which comprise it are
unique. This is what Osgood has referred
to as the "ernic' principle of behavior
and is illustrated in Figure 2.
The rm's (both those with upper and
lower case m's) may be viewed as hypothetical constructs rather than intervening
variables. rm's and their automatic consequences sm's are given functional definitions in terms of S-R theory and thus
allow the incorporation within the semantic mediation process of more general
theories of learning. This is handy, indeed, because it admits all the more traditional single-stage theories of learning
such as habit strength and generalization.
Osgood (1971) has reconciled representa-

tional mediation and single-stage principles, stating that "... both the big, total

M's and the little component m's have
response-like functions as dependent
events (in semantic encoding or sentence
understanding) and stimulus-like functions
as antecedent events (in encoding or sentence creating)" (p. 13).
As to the source of the rm's and their
differentiation from the total overt behavior exhibited to the things signified
(RT), Osgood (1971) points to the historical nature of the rm's in the development
of the individual using them. He emphasizes that "... rm's are representations of
those aspects of the RT'S which have
made a difference in the appropriateness
of behaving with respect to those things
signified by signs and have therefore been
differentially reinforced" (p. 13)
Three distinctive features of Osgood's
"ernic' theory are revealed in Figure 3.
First, rM is an abstract entity or theoretical construct. It is observable in itself, except through the observation of its consequences in behavior. Secondly, rM explains
the functional equivalence of different behavioral events. In the diagram, for example, signs one and two are shown to have
the same combination of rm's and thus
the same meaning. Finally, rM is shown to
be a simultaneous "bundle" of distinctive
components (rm's); these component bundles serve to differentiate meaning. In the
diagram, signs one and three are the same
except for the presence of component
four vs. three, respectively (Osgood, 1971).
The function of these hypothetical constructs in the mediation process is determined by three characteristics of human
cognitive processes (Tzeng, 1972). First,
there is a bi-polar organization to human
cognitive processes, a "pulling" between
opposite poles or forces. From this, scales
of the semantic differential are devised as
continua between polar opposites. Second, there is an attribution of positive
polarity to one of the poles of each dimension of the qualification of experience. Thus it is noted that "strong" tends
to be associated with "active" and "good",
rather than with "sedentary" and "bad".
All are somehow psychologically positive,
a finding which is generalizable across
cultures and language groups (Osgood,
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May, & Miron, 1975). Third, there is a
tendency toward parallel polarity of the
rm components of meaning; thus, the
positive of these small dimensions line up
to define the bundle of rm's necessary for
meaning.
This model suggests that theoretically
there exists a "semantic space" of n
dimensions in which meaning might be
located. The dimensions of the space are
defined by groups of bi-polar, parallel
rm's. An example of such a space is found
in Figure 4, which demonstrates a threedimensional semantic space of Evaluation,
Potency, and Activity, Osgood's famous
E-P-A structure for affective meaning.
These dimensions are taken as functional
representations of the rm bundles. The
spatial model suggests, in turn, that factor
analytic procedures are appropriate techniques for "discovering" these dimensions. That is, great amounts of information in the form of variance in semantic
components uncovered by individual
semantic scales are distilled and explained
by a much smaller number of factors
(rm's) which taken together define the location of a point in the spatial model and
define rM or meaning. Osgood's explanation of the example shown as Figure 3
will serve to clarify the situation (Osgood,
1971):

... application of the factor-analytic
measurement model provides a framework of underlying dimensions which is

common to both concept meanings and
scale meanings and in terms of which
both can be described in relation to each
other. These underlying dimensions thus
have the functional properties of semantic features. Anticipating our results for
those who are unfamiliar with this research, SD technique yields three dominant affective factors or features: Evaluation (Good/Bad), Potency (StrongIWeak),
and Activity (Active/Passive). We refer to
scales having loadings on these underlying factors; the scale kind-cruel, for example, has loadings of .70 on E, - .35
on P (that is cruel is more potent than
kind), and - .15 on A. From these loadings we can assign kind and cruel their
reciprocal locations in the space. We can
characterize kind as being Very Good,
Quite Weak, and Slightly Passive, affectively and cruel as being Very Bad, Quite
Strong, and Slightly Active. We refer to
concepts having scores on these same
underlying factors. If the concept COWARD, for example, had scores of - .15
on E, - .70 on P, and + .20 on A, its affective paraphrase would be "a coward
is quite bad, very weak, and slightly inactive". Making the projections from the
COWARD point to the underlying kindcruel line in the three-factor space, we
predict that COWARD will be rated as
"slightly cruel" on the underlying kindcruel scale. Predictions of all concepti
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